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Crowdsourcing contests provide an effective way to 
elicit novel ideas and creative solutions from collective 
intelligence. A key design feature of crowdsourcing 
contests is the competition between contest participants 
to complete a specific task with financial awards to the 
winner(s).  In recent years, some crowdsourcing contest 
platforms provide options to contest participants for 
solution sharing during the competition. This study 
intends to evaluate the influence of exposure to shared 
solutions on different stakeholders, including the team, 
and the requester. Our study employs a multiple-level 
panel data from a large online crowdsourcing platform, 
Kaggle.com, to examine these effects. For teams, 
exposure to shared solutions helps new entrant teams to 
jump-start and help teams to achieve better 
performance in the subsequent submissions, and the 
teams’ skill level negatively moderates these positive 
effects. For requesters, allowing solution sharing has 
both benefits and costs in terms of improving the best 
performance of the crowd. We highlight the theoretical 
implications of the study and provide practical 
suggestions for crowdsourcing contest platforms to help 
them decide whether to allow solution sharing during 
the competition. 
1. Introduction  
Crowdsourcing contests have become more and 
more attractive for organizations to generate ideas and 
solve problems because of the unprecedented scale and 
diversified background of the labor pool they provide 
[1]. An increasing number of organizations, including 
governments (e.g., Health and Human Services 
Department), research institutes (e.g., NASA), large 
enterprises (e.g., General Electric, LG), have started to 
employ crowdsourcing contests to enable their research 
and development process1. 
                                                 
1 https://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovation-
success/ 
Online crowdsourcing contest platforms facilitate 
access to a large labor pool and provide an easily 
accessible and efficient way for companies to obtain 
ideas and/or solutions [2]. To attract more participants 
and achieve better crowdsourcing outcomes, 
crowdsourcing contest platforms explore ways in an 
attempt to lower entry barriers and reduce participation 
costs for contestants. For example, kaggle.com, the 
largest crowdsourcing platform focusing on data 
science-related problems, provides a mechanism that 
allows participants to share their intermediary solutions 
during the contest. To motivate contestants to share 
high-quality solutions, Kaggle awards the authors of 
popular shared solutions. During the competition, the 
contestants take shared solutions as a benchmark or 
inspiration to aid their innovations [2]. To come up with 
solutions, contestants first search over the solution space 
in the exploration stage. For example, when contestants 
first join a competition, they explore the task 
requirement specified by the requesters and explore all 
the existing solutions either provided by other solvers or 
provided outside the platform. Then in the exploitation 
stage, they exploit the most promising area found in the 
exploration stage. Allowing solution sharing may cause 
contestants to shift their effort from exploring new 
directions independently to exploiting the shared 
solutions.  
From the exploitation perspective, using shared 
solutions helps contestants gain the required skill and 
knowledge quickly and boost their performance [3]. 
Meanwhile, contestants can allocate more time to the 
critical components of the solution because they do not 
need to duplicate effort on reinventing the basic 
components. As a result, the final solution could be 
improved. In a way, that is how society has progressed 
by building upon shared knowledge.  
From the exploration perspective, allowing solution 
sharing may also have some unintended effects. For 
example, allowing solution sharing may disincentivize 





contestants from exploring new directions 
independently. One of the primary goals of high-skilled 
contestants for innovation is to win the award/prize with 
the minimum effort. To economize their effort level, 
contestants may shift the effort from exploring new 
directions to exploiting the existing shared solutions. 
Shared solutions may cause contestants to think inside 
the boundary set by existing solutions, which is 
detrimental in the innovation process. The above 
discussions suggest that there are tradeoffs in allowing 
solution sharing for different stakeholders. The 
consequence of solution sharing is still unclear.   
This study intends to evaluate the influence of 
solution sharing in crowdsourcing contests on different 
stakeholders, including the participating teams and the 
requester, which initiates the contest. Specifically, we 
address the following research questions: 
1. How does exposure to shared solutions 
influence the performance of participating teams at 
different skill levels? 
2. How does exposure to shared solutions 
influence participating teams’ parallel path effect and 
the contest outcomes?  
 
We find that solution sharing is overall beneficial 
for the crowdsourcing platform, the requester, and the 
teams. For participating teams, solution sharing helps 
new entrant teams to jump-start and helps existing teams 
to achieve better performance during the contests. Low-
skilled teams benefit more from solution sharing 
functionality. For requesters, allowing solution sharing 
has both benefits and costs in terms of improving the 
best performance of the crowd. The findings have 
important implications for crowdsourcing contest 
platforms.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’ 
First-Submission Performance  
When new entrant teams, which are inexperienced 
in a contest, are exposed to the shared solutions, they 
can learn from these shared solutions to gain the 
required skills and domain knowledge [4]-[5]. The 
learning behavior is similar to exploitation in solution 
search literature [6]-[7]. Exploitation here means that 
contestants can exploit the promising intermediary 
solutions shared by others. Exploiting existing 
knowledge helps individuals to get workable solutions 
[8], have more innovative [9], and more effective 
solutions [10], and achieve more secure performance 
outcomes [11]. When the number of shared solutions is 
bigger, new entrant teams to a contest can learn more to 
boost their first-submission performance. 
It is worth noting that the positive effect of shared 
solutions on teams’ first-submission performance might 
be heterogeneous for teams at different skill levels. For 
high-skilled teams, they may benefit less from learning 
from the shared solutions. Because they already 
mastered the required skills and domain knowledge to 
start the contest independently, and/or shared solutions 
may hinder these teams from thinking beyond the 
boundary set by these shared solutions, which is called 
‘adverse fixation effect’ in the innovation literature 
(e.g., [12]-[14]). Therefore, the high-skilled teams will 
benefit less from shared solutions to jump-start their 
first-submission performance. 
H1a. The number of shared solutions in a contest 
improves the teams’ first-submission performance (i.e., 
the performance of the new entrant teams to a contest). 
H1b. The lower the skill level of new entrant teams, the 
greater the effect of shared solutions on the teams’ first-
submission performance. 
2.2. Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’ 
Subsequent Performance 
Teams can broaden their skill sets and improve their 
solutions during the contest through observational 
learning from the shared solutions. Teams who have low 
performance in the contest have much space to improve 
by learning from shared solutions. However, high-
performance teams in a contest are less likely to keep 
improving their performance through learning because 
they already have outstanding performance compared 
with their peers. At the same time, the fixation effects 
influence high-skilled teams more because they have the 
required skills to come up with high-quality solutions if 
they think independently. When the high-skilled teams 
learn from the solutions proposed by others, they may 
get stuck by the shared solutions and/or they may 
incorporate some inappropriate (even detrimental) 
features in their own solutions unintentionally [15]. 
Therefore exposure to shared solutions may benefit 
high-skilled teams less compared with average-skilled 
teams during the competition. 
H2a. The number of solutions used by teams has a 
positive effect on their subsequent solution 
performance. H2b. The lower the teams’ historical 
performance in a contest, the greater the positive effect 
of solution usage on their subsequent solution 
performance. 
2.3. Impact of Solution Sharing on the Best-
performance of the Crowd 
Parallel path effects predict when teams develop 
solutions independently and parallelly, the increased 
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number of teams leads to a higher chance that the 
contest might get an exceptionally high-quality solution 
[16] – [21]. In our study, the data science task (e.g., 
finding dark matter in the universe) is highly 
complicated and uncertain, and this high uncertainty 
amplifies the parallel path effects [21]. So adding more 
teams increases the chance that the requester gets an 
exceptionally high-quality solution. 
During the contest, exposure to solutions shared by 
others helps high-skilled teams to come up with 
revolutionary creative solutions. First, when teams work 
on high-quality shared solutions as benchmarks, they 
can save time from duplicating the basic components of 
the same task and use these saved time to work on the 
critical components of the task. Second, when teams can 
observe multiple shared solutions, they have a decent 
chance of finding superior solutions that provide them 
with perspectives from a new angle. Jeppesen and 
Lakhani [22] empirically found that the provision of 
winning solutions is positively related to the distance 
between the solver’s expertise and the focal field of the 
problem. The rationale behind this phenomenon is that 
when the current direction of the solution does not work, 
having a perspective outside the current field domain 
may help to generate an effective solution. From this 
perspective, exposure to the existing superior solutions 
shared by others with different skillsets may help teams 
to have alternative perspectives. Thirdly, teams can 
compare their solutions with the existing shared 
solutions and then reflect and revise their own solutions. 
This reflection process is essential in experiential 
learning. 
However, shared solutions may hinder the 
independent revolutionary thinking of creative teams 
and make them conform to shared solutions. Best-
performance solutions, which beat all other solutions, 
are likely to be revolutionary creative solutions. When 
exposed to the shared solutions, the high-skilled teams 
who have the potential to come up with these best-
performance solutions might be more vulnerable to the 
fixation effects. For these highly creative teams, being 
exposed to solutions shared by others may trigger 
conformity effects and hinder them from proposing 
extremely creative solutions [13]. After being exposed 
to shared solutions, these shared solutions are 
involuntarily retrieved in mind and cannot be 
deliberately rejected [13]. To sum up, the shared 
solutions may attenuate the parallel path effects because 
the shared solutions may discourage the most creative 
teams from thinking independently.  
H3a. The number of teams increases the best 
solution performance of all teams (i.e., the parallel path 
effects). H3b. The number of shared solutions increases 
the best solution performance of all teams. H3c. The 
more the shared solutions, the smaller the effect of the 
number of teams on the best solution performance. 
 
3. Research Context and Data 
Our study employs a multiple-level panel data from 
a large online crowdsourcing platform, Kaggle.com, to 
examine the effects of solution sharing on different 
stakeholders. Kaggle is a crowdsourcing contest 
platform, which allows requesters to post contests and 
seek solutions for their data science tasks. There are 
multiple reasons why we chose Kaggle as our research 
context. First, Kaggle provides ‘kernel’ functionality to 
encourage contestants to share solutions during the 
contest. ‘Kaggle kernel’ means shared scripts/IPython 
Notebooks/R Markdown, combining the programming 
environment, input, code, and output. Contestants can 
share the intermediary solutions by making their kernels 
public. The shared kernels are available to all teams. 
Kaggle tries to use the kernel function to help 
contestants to manage and share their data science work. 
Second, Kaggle provides a well-organized and daily 
updated archival dataset (i.e., Meta Kaggle), enabling 
scholars to examine the effects of exposure to shared 
solutions at multiple levels empirically.  
Until Nov 2019 (the time we got our data), Kaggle 
has held 360 different public contests since its launch. 
In our study, we only include 237 contests that provide 
a monetary reward. We exclude the contests held for 
new contestants in Kaggle for educational purposes, 
consistent with previous studies [23]. In the Kaggle 
contests, solutions are submitted based on teams, and 
the majority teams are single-member teams. Each 
contest gives the upper bound of the number of team 
members. 
4. Variables, Model Specification and 
Results 
Our analysis is at different levels, including contest 
level and team level. To quantify the impact of solution 
sharing on different stakeholders, we aggregate the 
team-level panel data to contest level to test our H1 and 
H3, and we use the single-member-team-level analysis 
to test our H2. We employ the fixed effects as our main 
identification strategies for all analyses, including the 
team-specific and contest-specific fixed effects. These 
fixed effects help us account for average differences 
across teams and contests in any observable or 
unobservable predictors, such as the team’s job 
experience and contest complexity.  
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4.1. Impact of Solution Sharing on Team’s First-
Submission Performance 
To examine how the shared solutions help new 
entrant teams to get better performance, we only 
consider the first submission of each team, and our 
analysis is at the contest-day level. More specifically, 
we aggregate the team-level first submission 
performance to the contest level to study how the 
number of shared solutions available before teams 
submit their first solution influences these teams’ first-
submission performance. During the time window of the 
analysis, each contest attracts 13 teams on average per 
day (the Std. Dev. is 22.2). In our analysis, we aggregate 
the performance of all teams’ first-submission solutions 
of a contest on the same day by using the daily average 
performance scores. To ensure that new entrant teams’ 
daily performance scores are comparable across 
different contests, we calculate the normalized 
performance scores.  Specifically,  we use Equation 1 to 
calculate the normalized average daily performance 
scores of teams’ first-submission solutions. The 
normalized performance scores are independent of the 
contest. 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡  =   
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇)
𝜎𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇
× 1(𝑗)    (1) 
, where 𝑗 indexes contest 𝑗, 𝑡 denotes time 𝑡,  and 1(∙) is the indicator function, and the definition of this indicator 
function is: 
1(𝑗) =  {
 1  𝑖𝑓  performance 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  
−1 𝑖𝑓 performance 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
 
 
There are different types of evaluation metrics, 
including the accuracy type and error rate type. In the 
accuracy type of metrics, the high-performance score 
represents high performance. However, in the error rate 
type of metrics, the smaller score represents better 
performance. Here we use an indicator function to 
ensure that the high normalized performance score 
represents high performance. 
We use the performance in the private leaderboard 
to measure the team’s first-submission performance. 
Kaggle calculates the public score by a relatively small 
portion of the holdout set (e.g., 10%) and calculates the 
private leaderboard by a more substantial portion of the 
holdout set (e.g., 90%). We use the performance in the 
public leaderboard as the robustness check, and the 
results are consistent. The variable of interest is the 
number of solutions available at time t-1 (i.e., 
KernelNumj,t−1 ). We also control for the number of 
posts in the forum (ForumPostNumj,t−1) at t-1. Note 
that using variables KernelNumj,t−1  and 
ForumPostNumj,t−1  effectively address the potential 
concern of reverse causality.   
Teams may show strategic behavior during the 
competition. For example, teams exert more effort 
toward the end of the competition to avoid submission 
wars [24]. High-quality teams will submit their 
solutions later than inexperienced ones, and high-
quality teams are less likely to enter tasks when a high-
quality solution has already been submitted [25]. Failure 
to account for these timing strategies may bias our 
results. For instance, if experienced team leaders 
strategically wait until the end to submit their solutions 
(e.g., [25]), these teams are more likely to have better 
performance no matter they can learn from the shared 
solutions or not. 
To account for the timing strategy mentioned 
above, we control for the time elapsed (TimeElapsedj,t) 
of a contest and the average quality of team leaders in 
our analysis. The time elapsed is measured by the 
percentage of contest time elapsed since the start 
divided by the contest’s total duration [24]. The 
measurement of the average quality of team leaders of 
new entrant teams includes the  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡   and 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 .  
Further, we control the contest-specific fixed 
effects to address systematic contest differences that are 
invariant over time. Failure to control for these contest-
specific characteristics may lead to the spurious 
correlation between exposure to shared solutions and 
team performance. For example, suppose some 
attractive contests (e.g., contests with the higher budget) 
draw more high-skilled entrants and shared solutions 
simultaneously. In that case, the regression results will 
be biased without controlling the contest-specific fixed 
effects. 
We specify our model as Equation 2 to test our H1 
and present the definition and the summary statistics of 
the variables in Panel A of Table 1. We log-transformed 
some of our independent variables due to the high data 
skewness [33].  
 
Table 1 Variables Used to Test H1 and H3 (Contest-level Analysis) 
Panel A: Variables Used to Test H1 (Contest-Day Level) 
Dependent Variable  N mean sd min max 
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𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 The normalized average score of new entrant teams’ first 
submissions in contest j on day t in the public leaderboard 
(only used in the robustness check) 
12630 0.000 0.992 -12.04 8.460 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 The normalized average score of new entrant teams’ first 
submissions in contest j on day t in the private leaderboard 
12450 0.000 0.993 -12.04 8.481 
Variable of Interest 
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 The number of shared solutions in contest j on or before t − 1 15753 107.6 244.0 0 2611 
Control Variables 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 The number of available posts in the forum of contest j on or 
before t − 1 
15753 68.91 86.71 0 648 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 The percentage of contest (j) time elapsed as of current day t 15753 0.508 0.289 0.00143 1 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 The percent of new entrant teams’ leaders without contest 
experience in contest j on day t 
13178 0.548 0.297 0 1 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 The average historical contest rank percentile of the leaders of 
new entrant teams’ in contest j on day t 
10860 0.429 0.145 0.00152 1 
Panel B: Variables Used to Test H3 (Contest-Week Level) 
Dependent Variable 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 Normalized best performance score of all  teams in contest j at 
or before week t in the public leaderboard (only used in the 
robustness check) 
845 0.000 0.697 -2.474 2.153 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 Normalized best performance score of all  teams in contest j at 
or before week t in the private leaderboard 
860 0.000 .695 -2.341 2.171 
Variable of Interest 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 The number of teams in contest j at or before week t 860 1087.6 1176.6 16 8491 
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 The number of shared kernels in contest j at or before week t 860 247.6 339.1 0 2528 
 
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 × ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 +
1) + 𝛽 × ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) +  𝛽 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽 × 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼𝑗 +  𝜖𝑗𝑡  (2) 
 




ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 0.0968* 
 (0.0509) 
ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 0.124** 
 (0.0620) 
ln (𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 1) -0.531*** 
 (0.0871) 








Number of Contests 212 
Contest FE YES 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
 
As shown in Table 2, the lagged number of shared 
solutions is positively related to the teams’ first-
submission performance in the private leaderboard, 
supporting our H1a. Our results indicate when the 
number of shared solutions increases by 10%, the new-
entrant teams’ normalized performance would increase 
by 1%. For requesters in the crowdsourcing contest, 
they care more about the daily best-performance. To this 
end, we also examine the effect of shared solutions on 
the daily best performance across all first-submission 
solutions in the robustness check section. Similarly, the 
number of shared solutions is positively related to the 
daily best performance across all first-submission 
solutions.  
After examining the effect of exposure to shared 
solutions on the team’s first-submission performance, 
we are still interested in whether this effect is different 
across the contestants with different qualities. We 
leverage the regression quantile method proposed by 
Machado and Santos Silva [26] to examine this 
heterogeneous effect. Whereas the OLS estimates the 
conditional mean of the new entrant’s performance 
across predictor variables, the regression quantiles 
estimate the conditional quantiles of the response 
variable. The higher quantiles represent the performance 
of a higher skill level. We run the regression quantiles 
for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and the 90th percentiles of 
the distribution and find the positive effect of shared 
solutions is stronger on low-performance distribution 
than on high-performance distribution, which supports 
our H1b.  
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Table 3 the Impact of Solution Sharing on New Entrants’ Average Performance (Regression Quantile) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome Variable (quantile): 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 
 q10 q30 q50 q70 q90 
ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 0.118** 0.105*** 0.0963*** 0.0891*** 0.0797** 
 (0.0564) (0.0339) (0.0235) (0.0225) (0.0330) 
ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 0.194** 0.148*** 0.117*** 0.0911*** 0.0573 
 (0.0883) (0.0530) (0.0368) (0.0353) (0.0517) 
ln (𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 1) -0.258 -0.433*** -0.547*** -0.645*** -0.773*** 
 (0.181) (0.109) (0.0754) (0.0723) (0.106) 
log_AvgRankPercentile_Sub -1.389*** -1.234*** -1.132*** -1.045*** -0.932*** 
 (0.249) (0.149) (0.104) (0.0995) (0.146) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.229 -0.0450 0.0754 0.179** 0.313*** 
 (0.182) (0.109) (0.0760) (0.0729) (0.107) 
Observations 10,104 10,104 10,104 10,104 10,104 
Contest FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.2. Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’ 
Subsequent Performance 
Even though contestants can observe all the shared 
solutions, they may not choose to use all the solutions 
given their limited cognitive ability. Therefore, we 
operationalize ‘exposure to the shared solutions’ as ‘the 
number of votes given to shared solutions.’ Giving votes 
to solutions that contestants think is useful is a social 
norm in Kaggle, and Kaggle encourages all contestants 
to follow this norm. The voted solutions are more likely 
to be exploited by contestants. 
The solution voting behavior happens at the 
contestant level, but the performance is measured at the 
team level. Leveraging the single-member teams can 
help us avoid the level mismatch issue. Therefore, we 
conduct a single-member-team week level analysis.  In 
Kaggle competition, most teams are single-member 
teams, as indicated by the average team size 1.028. 
Focusing on the single-member teams does not hinder 
the generalizability of our results. As a robustness check 
of our contestant-level exposure measurement, we 
operationalize ‘exposure to the shared solutions’ using 
‘the number of shared solutions,’ and the results are 
consistent. 
We organize our data at a weekly level because 
most of the contestants update their submission entries 
on a weekly base. In our time window of analysis, each 
contestant submits 1.2 entries per week on average. The 
dependent variable is the normalized average 
performance of the single-member team 𝑖 in contest 𝑗 at 
week 𝑡. We use Equation 3 to calculate the normalized 
average daily performance scores of each single-
member team (i.e., a contestant at a contest) at a 
different time: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  =   
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖=1…𝐼,𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇)
𝜎𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖=1…𝐼,𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇
× 1(𝑗)    (3) 
We use Equation 4 as the model specification to test 
our H2. In the analysis, we control for the team fixed 
effects to account for the team-specific factors, 
including the team’s capability. We also account for the 
teams’ effort level through controlling for the lagged 
number of submissions and the lagged performance in 
the public leaderboard during the contest [33]. We 
present the definition and the summary statistics of the 
variables in Table 4.  
As shown in Table 5, our results indicate a positive 
relationship between exposure to shared solutions and 
the team’s performance. The lagged performance 
negatively moderates this positive relationship, which 
supports our H2a and H2b. Exposure to one more 
solution increases the team’s standardized performance 
by 0.6%. 
 
Table 4 Variables Used to Test H2 (Single-Member-Team-level Analysis) 
Dependent Variable N mean sd min max 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 The normalized average score of single-member team 𝑖 in 
contest j at week t in the public leaderboard (only used in the 
robustness check).  
2539178 -0.146 1.173 -104.6 39.46 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 The normalized average score of single-member team 𝑖 in 
contest j at week t in the private leaderboard.  
2539178 -0.133 1.188 -109.8 12.01 
Page 6558
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 The number of code submissions by single-member team 𝑖 in 
contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡.  
2539178 1.198 23.28 0 11563 
Variable of Interest 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 The number of votes given by single-member team 𝑖 to the 
shared solutions in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1. 
2539178 0.0411 0.402 0 113 
Control Variables 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 The number of comments given by single-member team 𝑖 to 
the shared solutions in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1. 
2539178 0.00805 0.141 0 31 
SubmissionNum𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) The number of solution submissions by single-member team 
𝑖 in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1. 
     
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 The percentage of contest (𝑗) time elapsed as of current week 
t for single-member team 𝑖 
2539178 0.542 0.289 0.00990 1 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ×
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4 ×  𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡   (4)  
 
Table 5 the Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’ 
Performance 
Model (1) (2) 
DV 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.00643*** 0.0167*** 




  (0.00933) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) 6.97e-05 0.671*** 
 (9.30e-05) (0.0165) 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.669*** 7.69e-05 
 (0.0165) (9.37e-05) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.0269*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.00285) (0.00283) 
Constant  -0.0510*** 
  (0.00339) 
Observations 2,326,971 2,326,971 
R-squared 0.424 0.425 
Number of Teams 208,197 208,197 
Team FE YES YES 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
4.3. Solution Sharing Has Competing Effects 
on Best Solutions  
We employ the panel VAR (e.g., [27]) approach to 
account for the bilateral effect between the performance 
of the best solutions and the team number, while 
controlling for contest-specific heterogeneity. Panel 
VAR technique combines the traditional VAR 
approach, which treats all variables as endogenous 
variables, and the panel-data approach, which can 
control panel-specific heterogeneity. Therefore, Panel 
VAR models allow us to account for the bilateral effect 
and control the unobserved contest-specific 
heterogeneity. We specify our models as follows: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  Γ𝑌𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡    
 
Where 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is a four-variable 
vector {ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1), ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 +
1),  ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) × ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1),
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗  )} . The 
crowd’s best performance measurement is the highest 
score of all teams until a given week. We organize our 
contest panel data for the panel VAR analysis at the 
contest-week level.  
Kaggle has two different contest formats, including 
the simple competition and two-stage competition 
format. As for two-stage competitions, Meta Kaggle 
does not provide teams’ performance on the first stage. 
Therefore, we only include 91 simple competitions 
launched after Kaggle introduced kernel functionality in 
our contest-week level panel VAR analysis. We present 
the definition and the summary statistics of the variables 
in Panel B of Table 1. The variables of interest include 
the number of teams, the number of shared solutions, 
and the interaction term between the number of teams 
and the number of shared solutions. TeamNum and 
KernelNum variables are log-transformed due to the 
skewness of the data.  
For our panel VAR analysis, we first need to decide 
the period of lags in our model. We use the model 
selection criteria to help us find out the optimal period 
of lags. We calculate the model selectin criteria 
measures for first to fifth-order panel VAR using the 
first six lags of {ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 +
1), ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1),  ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) ×
ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1),
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗  )}. Based 
on the criteria proposed by Andrews and Lu [28], we 
should select the model with the smallest Bayesian 
Information Criterion (MBIC), Akaike Information 
Criterion (MAIC), and Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion (MQIC). In general, the first-order panel VAR 
is the preferred model since it has the smallest MBIC 
and MQIC. We also check the stability condition of the 
estimated panel VAR, and we find that all eigenvalues 
lie inside the unit circle, which means that the estimate 
is stable. Finally, we check the Hansen’s J test, and the 
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Hansen’s J statistics are insignificant, which means that 
we cannot reject our GMM-style instruments are valid. 
The estimation results for our panel VAR model are 
shown in Table 6. Our main objective is to examine how 
the team number and kernel number jointly influence 
the performance of the best solution. The one-period 
lagged dependent variables allow us to interpret the 
short-term effect more easily. The results indicate that 
attracting more teams and encouraging teams to share 
more solutions at time t-1 positively affects the best 
performance of all teams in the next period. However, 
the number of shared solutions negatively moderates the 
relationship between the team number and the best 
performance of all teams (i.e., the parallel path effect). 
These results support our H3a, H3b, and H3c. 
 
Table 6 Panel VAR Estimation for 𝑴𝒂𝒙𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒋 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1)  ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) 
× ln (𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 
















 ln (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 

















*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our studies theoretically proposed and 
empirically examined how the contestants with 
different skill levels are influenced differently by the 
exposure to shared solutions through learning and 
fixing effects.  Our results suggest that the overall 
effects of exposure to shared solutions on the 
contestants are favorable in general, but high-skilled 
contestants benefit less on average. However, the 
effects on the crowd’s best performance are not 
necessarily positive. Even though exposure to shared 
solutions has a positive main effect on the 
performance, it may also discourage parallel path 
effects. 
This work offers both theoretical and managerial 
contributions. Theoretically, our study adds to the 
crowdsourcing literature by providing a detailed 
analysis of the effect of allowing solution sharing on 
different stakeholders in the crowdsourcing contest 
platform. Research regarding the effects of exposure 
to solutions generated and shared by other solvers in 
crowdsourcing contests remains nascent and 
underexplored ([29] - [32] are a few exceptions).  
Current empirical studies mainly studying this effect 
focus more on how different dimensions of a shared 
solution (e.g., originality, quality) influence the 
contestants’ performance (Ba et al. 2017, Jin 2018) 
[31]-[32]. Our study focuses on how contestant’s 
quality moderates the effect of exposure to shared 
solutions on the performance. We point out that the 
sharing may lead to unintended outcomes (e.g., 
reduced parallel path effect). 
From the managerial perspective, this work offers 
insights for managers who are currently debating the 
legality of allowing solution sharing in the 
crowdsourcing contest platform for data science tasks. 
Even though allowing solution sharing might be 
beneficial to the platform, the requesters, and the 
contestants on average, managers in the 
crowdsourcing contest platforms still need to be 
cautious when they make a decision related to 
allowing solution sharing because of the existence of 
unintended adverse effects. The decision should be 
made based on the tradeoff between the benefits (e.g., 
learning effect) and the costs (e.g., fixation effect) of 
the solution sharing. For example, if some contests 
want to make new contestants familiar with the task 
quickly, motivating more shared solutions is the 
dominant strategy. However, if some contests already 
have attracted a large number of teams from diverse 
backgrounds, discouraging solution sharing (at least 
the low-quality solutions) might be the dominant 
strategy, given shared solutions may inhibit the 
parallel path effect. 
Several future extensions are possible. In this 
study, we could not observe how and to what extent 
contestants used the shared solutions based on our 
data, so we use voting behavior as a proxy for the 
exposure to the shared solutions. Future studies 
focusing on the effects of exposure to shared solutions 
in the crowdsourcing contest may want to measure 
solution usage more directly with the proper private 
dataset (e.g., the log data). For instance, with the log 
data, scholars can measure how much time contestants 
spent on exploiting each existing solution and how 
much effort contestants spend. Second, we only 
examined the effect of solution sharing for the data-
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science related tasks. Future studies can also examine 
the impact on other types of crowdsourcing tasks, 
including the tasks evaluated by the subjective criteria 
(e.g., the logo design tasks and web development 
tasks). Third, even though we examined how 
contestants’ skill level moderates the effect of shared 
solutions, future studies can focus more on how the 
types (e.g., educational purpose versus solution 
leaking purpose) and the quality (e.g., high- versus 
low-quality) of shared solutions moderate the effect. 
Forth, although we use the fixed effects as our main 
identification strategies to examine how exposure to 
shared solutions influences contestants’ performance 
(a common identification strategy used for the online 
crow platform studies, e.g., [33]-[34]), it is still 
interesting to test the predictive power of these shared 
solutions using machine learning techniques.  
Appendix. Robustness Check 
A1. An Alternative Measurement of Team 
Performance 
For our H1, we use the best daily performance 
instead of average daily performance to measure the 
new entrant teams’ performance. The results are 
highly consistent. 
For our H1, H2 and H3, we use the performance 
in the private leaderboard as the measurement of 
teams’ performance. As a robustness check, we use the 
performance in the public leaderboard as the 
measurement of teams’ performance. All results using 
alternative measurements are consistent.  
A2. Heteroscedasticity-based Instrument 
To examine whether the shared solutions help 
new entrant teams to achieve better performance at 
their first submissions (i.e., our H1a), we use the 
mathematically generated instrumental variables to 
test the robustness of our OLS estimates. We construct 
the orthogonal instruments mathematically using the 
method proposed by Lewbel [35]. Lewbel’s method 
treats all covariates as exogenous and constructs 
orthogonal instruments mathematically from these 
covariates (e.g., [36]). In our model, we treat the 
quality of new entrants and duration elapsed as 
exogenous variables to construct instruments for our 
endogenous term (i.e., the shared solutions number at 
time t-1). We implement this method using xtivreg2h 
command in STATA, and we account for the contest-
specific fixed effects using the fe option. The highly 
consistent results indicate that the specific instruments 
we chose do not drive our 2SLS results.  
Table 7 the Impact of Solution Sharing on New Entrant 
Teams’ Performance (Lewbel type IV) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 




0.137*** 0.144*** 0.252*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0386) (0.0388) 
ln (𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡
+ 1) 
-0.414*** -0.490***   




-1.223*** -1.168*** -0.940*** -0.923*** 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.0934) (0.0954) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 0.266*** 0.238*** 0.702*** 0.622*** 
 (0.0619) (0.0620) (0.0542) (0.0544) 
Observatio
ns 
10,227 10,104 10,399 10,310 
R-squared 0.041 0.039 0.150 0.127 










1252.981 1303.022 1232.760 1220.444 
Hansen J 
statistic 




0.6339 0.2144 0.0990 0.2192 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
A3. Alternative Measurement of Exposure to 
Shared Solutions at the Team Level 
For our team-level analysis, we use the solution 
voting behavior to measure contestants’ exposure to 
shared solutions. Even though it is the platform norm 
for contestants to give votes to the shared solutions 
they used, it is still possible that some contestants used 
the shared solutions without voting. To mitigate this 
concern, we use the number of shared solutions 
available in the last period to measure the team’s 
exposure to shared solutions. We use this contest-level 
measurement as a robustness check for our H2, and our 
results are highly consistent. 
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